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This paper develops a simple model of competition among interconnected networks. 
Access fees are determined either by a regulator or by competition. We show that the price is 
higher when they compete in both access prices and final tariffs non-cooperatively than 
when the access fees are regulated. We also show that incentives to collude are higher when 
access fees are regulated to the level of marginal cost of access services. Thus it is 
ambiguous to judge the net effect of competition on prices and relevant regulations are 
necessary to enhance welfare effects. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model of competition between 
interconnected networks providing differentiated services. In the network industry it 
typically requires access to rival networks to provide services or to satisfy its customers. 
Such examples include networks for electricity transmission, gas transportation, 
telecommunication access, and banks’ ATM networks, etc.
1 This feature is what 
distinguishes the network industries from others in that interconnected firms try to take a 
dominant position not only by competing in prices but also by deteriorating competing 
network by charging excessive access fees, thereby raising rival’s costs. 
Access prices can be determined in two ways in general, which differ depending 
upon regulatory environment. Possibilities include; 1) the regulator determining access 
 
* I would like to thank an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier 
version of this paper. Of course, all remaining errors are mine. 
1  This open network architecture is typically motivated by the existence of substantial network 
externalities. In this paper we do not model network externalities. The purpose of the paper is not to explain 
why they choose to be interconnected but to study what will be networks’ behavior once they are 
interconnected. 
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charges for the best interests of social welfare; 2) the networks having discretion over 
strategically chosen access charges.
2  In this paper we analyze the effect of different way 
of determining access charges on final tariffs in the context of network competition, 
such as mandated cost-based access pricing rules and non-cooperatively determined 
access charges. In this regard, we study whether unregulated competition improves 
welfare via fierce competition among networks. 
We propose a model of network competition where network products are 
differentiated and networks compete in prices a la Bertrand. Networks’ providing 
services completes in two stages; in the first stage, access charges are determined, in the 
second stage, final tariffs are determined. As mentioned, we analyze two different ways 
of determining access charges. 
First, we study the case in which an arbitrarily chosen reciprocal access charges are 
given to networks in the first stage and they compete non-cooperatively in prices in the 
second stage. We investigate how the choice of access charges affects the final tariffs 
and what should be the optimal level to enhance welfare. Second, we study the case in 
which networks set their access charges non-cooperatively (possibly asymmetrically) in 
the first stage. It analyzes a two stage game where networks first choose access charges 
and second choose tariffs. We will compare non-cooperatively selected access charges 
with the optimal access charges and marginal costs of providing access. We will also 
compare final tariffs under a two stage game with that with optimal (or cost-based) 
access charges and investigate whether unregulated competition affects prices in the best 
interests of customers. One of this paper’s main focus is to investigate how discretion 
over access charges allowed to networks affects equilibrium. Networks revenue flows 
come from two different income streams; revenues by collecting tariffs from customers 
and revenues by collecting fees from the rival network for providing access services. 
When network products have large substitutability, excessive access charges affect 
profits in two opposite directions. First it raises its rival’s costs and thereby its prices, 
which let the firm have the edge on its rival in competing prices. But rival’s high prices 
will shrink customers relative to their own customers. This may cause deficits in access 
revenues. Thus in the setting of a two stage game, the problem of selecting access 
charges is very subtle. In this paper we will show that there always exits an equilibrium. 
We also study how unfettered competition among networks changes incentives of 
tacit collusion compared to limited competition where the regulator set access charges 
close to optimal level. For this purpose we analyze an infinitely repeated game in which 
firms interacts infinitely many times. We investigate whether the network’s incentive to 
collude tacitly with its rival when the access charges are regulated closely to the 
marginal costs of giving access. 
 
2 Armstrong et al. [1] categorizes these possibilities in four groups. Their categorization, however falls 
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Armstrong et al. [1] and Laffont et al. [3] are related to, but distinct from this paper. 
Armstrong et al. studies a model in which a dominant network controlling a essential 
facility (or bottleneck facility) should provide mandated access to entrants which do not 
have its own network. They give a rationale of the Efficient Component Pricing 
Rule(ECPR) by analyzing optimal access pricing problem similar to the one discussed in 
this paper. Their approach, however, is quite distinct from ours since we consider 
competition between two independent networks with its own networks. Laffont et al. is 
similar to ours in that they also pay attention to competition between interconnected 
networks. They develop a model of differentiated networks a la Hotelling and analyze 
how access charges affect the competitiveness of the industry. They investigated various 
issues including entry and nonlinear pricing, which is not covered in this paper. Their 
results, however, can not be applied to the study of competition between networks with 
large substitutability, which is a crucial weak point. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the model. Section 3 analyzes 
issues in three subsections. In Section 3.1, we investigate the case where the access 
charges are arbitrarily chosen by a regulator. In Section 3.2, we study a model of a two 
stage game in which access charges are selected non-cooperatively. In Section 3.3, we 




2.  MODEL 
 
We assume that there are two interconnected networks in the market. Two vertically 
integrated firms provide network services which are close substitutes, but the level of 
substitutability is not perfect. Networks compete in prices a la Bertrand and are assumed 
to have the following market demands; 
 
1 2 2 2 1 1 , np p m q np p m q + − = + − = ,                                    ( 1 )  
 
where  . This model differs from Laffont et al. [3] where the networks are 
differentiated a la Hotelling. Laffont et al. also studies competition among interconnected 
networks, and analyzes how networks’decisions on access fees and tariffs affect 
consumers’ choices and thus equilibria. We assumed away consumers’ behavior using 
the simplifying assumption of linear demands. There are literature on network 
competition using the linear demand structure, e.g., Armstrong et al. [1]   
1 0 < < n
Armstrong et al. differs from ours in that they study how the efficient access fees are 
determined if there are one vertically integrated network which controls the access to the 
bottleneck facilities to its competitors without fully integrated networks. CHONGMIN KIM
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We assume that two networks have the same cost structure. There is a fixed cost of 
providing services,   which includes network installing costs. 0 ≥ f
3 Throughout this 
paper it is assumed that the fixed costs are small enough for two networks to survive. 
Providing a service to its own customers incurs a marginal cost of c using its own 
networks. The marginal cost c consists of three parts. Consider customer A makes an 
phone call to customer B who subscribes to the same network. Then the network incurs 
a marginal cost   per call at the point where A uses the service and also at the 
terminating ends of the call, i.e., where B receives the call. Furthermore the network 
incurs a cost    in between. The total marginal cost of a call is thus  . 
0 c
1 c 1 0 2 c c c + ≡
To provide interconnection services, it is necessary to provide essential input 
services to its competing network. Networks charge fees for this service called 
interconnection charges or access charges. In the former case, a network pays as much 
for terminating a call on the competing network as it charges for terminating a call 
originated on the competing network. In contrast of reciprocal access fees, firms may set 
their access fees non-cooperatively and therefore possibly asymmetrically in 
nonreciprocal access pricing.
4  
The following assumption is very crucial for the analysis and is a modified version 
of the assumption of balanced calling pattern in Laffont et al. [3] 
  
Assumption 1: The number of calls originating on a network and completed on the 
same network is equal to the demand for the service. 
 
In Laffont et al. [3] the balanced calling pattern is assumed in terms of the 
percentage of services, and here it is assumed in terms of the number of services. Both 
assumptions imply that flows in and out of a network are balanced under the same tariff 
of network services. 
Each network’s objective is to maximize profits. They compete in tariffs in markets. 
Let   be the unit access fee to be paid for interconnection by a competing network to 




] ) ( ) [( ] ) [( ) , , , ( 0 0 i j j i i i j i j i i q c a q c a f q c p a a p p − − − + − − = ∏ .                  ( 2 )  
 
 
3 Fixed costs like network installing costs are usually joint and common costs in network industry. When 
there is a potential entrant who needs to pay fixed costs of this type to provide services and the entrant’s 
networks can be used by the incumbent, then strategic behavior of the incumbent may be quite different from 
other cases in typical industry. In this paper the fixed costs play no interesting role. 
4 In this paper, our main concern is both way interconnection. There is another type of interconnection, 
e.g., one way interconnection charges paid by the inter-exchange carriers to the local exchange carriers. 
Armstrong et al. [1] analyzed this type of interconnection charges. A SIMPLE APPROACH TO NETWORK COMPETITION  167
The above profit excludes both a selective interconnection approval and tariff 
discrimination. The network cannot deny the interconnection request by its rival, and 
strategically selective approval is forbidden in many countries. Furthermore the network 
is not allowed to discriminate tariffs between on-net calls and off-net calls. 
 
 
3.  MAIN  RESULTS 
 
This paper analyzes a competitive market environment in which regulation on final 
tariffs is withdrawn. And any type of explicit collusion among networks on final tariffs 
and access fees is not allowed. However we analyze the situation that access fees are 
determined by a regulator and that networks tacitly collude with each other. We consider 
two different market environments; First, access fees are determined by a regulator and 
given these firms competes non-cooperatively in markets; Second, in the first stage firms 
engage in access fee pricing competition and in the second stage they competes in the 
final tariffs. We will study how these two different market environments affect final 
tariffs. 
 
3.1  Regulated  Access  Pricing 
 
In this section, we first analyze networks’ final tariff competition given an reciprocal 
access charge set by a regulator. A network pays as much for termination of a call on the 
rival network as it receives for completing a call originated on the rival network. This 
case reflects the recent decision by US regulator (FCC) and UK regulator (Oftel). 
Let the reciprocal access fee be    In this case, two networks’ profits are given by 
r a
 




i i j i i q c a q c a f q c p a p p − − − + − − = ∏ .                    ( 3 )  
 
It says that if the access charge is greater than the marginal costs of providing access, 
i.e.,    then profits from providing access get bigger as it terminates more calls on 
nets than off nets. In case networks’ services are substitutes, it depends on tariffs each 
network imposes. Similarly in Laffont et al. [3], access revenue increases as its tariff 
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Equilibrium prices in Proposition 1 consist of two parts. The first part is determined 






 and the second part is determined by 
additional costs incurred by giving access  )
2
1






× − . That not only the costs of 
producing the final service but also the costs of giving essential inputs to its rival are 
crucial in determining the final tariff is what differentiates the network industry 
competition from the case of other industry. This is one of the reasons that make one to 
doubt if usual conclusions of introducing more competitions to markets, e.g., lower 
prices, are valid in the network industry. If the access charge is set at  , then the 




What is the most relevant access charge is not the main concern of this paper. 
Proposition 1, however, has an interesting policy implication with regard to a relevant 
access charge pricing. The level of relevant or optimal access charge must depend on the 
objective of the regulator, but it is often told that one of the main objectives of the 
regulator is to make networks to function as a public service that should abide by public 
welfare.
5 Let the regulator be a benevolent third party which sets the access charge to 
maximize consumer welfare under the constraint that networks break even.
6 Let this 
access charge be denoted by   and   be denoted by the corresponding symmetric 
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, and this implies that  . The 





Proposition 2: Unless the predetermined access charge is set sufficiently low, 
. Furthermore  . 
* p p




5 In many countries, regulators require networks to maintain the universal service as one of conditions of 
their license. This is one of evidences that networks are regarded as a public service as well as a profit 
pursuing firm. 
6 It is often assumed that the regulator maximizes consumer surplus satisfying zero profit conditions, e.g., 
[3], [4]. It is reasonable if regulated firms are public utilities. 
7 Proposition 2 confirms Proposition 3 of Laffont et al. [3] A SIMPLE APPROACH TO NETWORK COMPETITION  169
Notice that Proposition 2 does not imply that each network faces deficits under   
which are lower than the marginal costs of providing access. At equilibrium, flows in 
and out of each network are balanced, and thus there is no deficit in access revenue. 
Proposition 2, however, implies that the regulator can effectively control the tariff by 
regulating the access fee. 
R a
 
3.2    Two Stage Network Competition 
 
In this section, we assume that the networks set access fees non-cooperatively, and 
analyze a model of two stage games where the networks first set access fees and second 
compete in tariffs. 
We first look at the second stage, i.e., price competing stage, taking nonreciprocal 
access charges as given, and then study the first access charge competition stage 
backward. For given access fees  , network i’s profit maximizing first order 
condition is given by 
2 1, a a
 
. 2 , 1 , 0 )]} )( (
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From these conditions, we derive each network’s best responses as follows. 
 
2 , 1 , )), ( ) ( (
2
1
0 0 = − + − + + + = j i c a c a n c np m p j i j i .                      ( 7 )  
 
Thus the second stage Nash equilibrium given access charges is 
 

























p i i i .                      ( 8 )  
 
Using backward induction, we can express each network’s profit in terms of access 
fees. Then we can easily find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this two stage 
game. And it isn't difficult to show that there is a symmetric equilibrium. Let the 
symmetric access charges be denoted by  . Then in this two stage game the 
final tariff is determined by 
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Notice that the difference between   and   differs only from the way how 
access charges are determined; determined by a regulator    or by the market  . And 
it is worth noticing that the equilibrium price increases as the equilibrium access charge 
increases. In order to see if deregulating the network industry results in lower consumer 
prices, it suffices to compare   with c  since the regulator sets access charges below 
the marginal costs. Proposition 3 shows that the access charge determined by market 
forces is above the marginal costs. We first prove the following two lemmata. 
p ˆ
* p
r a a ˆ
a ˆ 0









a a j i i  
Proof :   is a quadratic function with regard to  , and thus it suffices to 
show that the coefficient of    is negative. The coefficient of   is 
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since  . This completes the proof. Q.E.D.  1 < n
 







Proof : Since   
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         ( 1 1 )  
 
the partial derivative of    with regard to    at the symmetric equilibrium is given as 
follows ; 
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c a                           ( 1 4 )  
 
That implies the proof. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3: In two stage games, the equilibrium access charge   is bigger than 
the marginal cost  . Furthermore,  . 
a ˆ
0 c a c a
R ˆ 0 < <
Proof: By Lemma 1,   is strictly concave for i=1,2. With Lemma 1, Lemma 2 
implies that  . Since two networks are symmetric, this completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
i Π
0 ˆ c a >
 
Since the equilibrium tariff increases with the access charge, the following 
Proposition follows. 
 
Proposition 4: Let  p  be the equilibrium price when the access charge is set at the 








. Then  p p p
R ˆ < < . 
 
The networks has an incentive to lower the price in order to attract more consumers 
when markets are more competitive, but at the same time has an incentive to increase 
rival's prices by increasing access charges. The networks are not only competitors in the 
final product market but also input suppliers as providers of essential facilities. When 
networks compete, there must arise a problem of interconnection. If the costs of 
interconnection is determined by market forces, then each network has an incentive to 
impose access charges higher than the marginal costs and thus to increase rival’s prices. 
Proposition 3 says that equilibrium access charges are above marginal costs and thus 
equilibrium prices are more than the desired level  . Thus it seems that when markets 
become deregulated and entries get easier, well designed limited competition tightly 
R pCHONGMIN KIM
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overwatched by a third party would improve welfare. Especially in the network industry 
how to use the bottleneck facility must serve the public’s purpose even if it is privately 
owned. This may provide a rationale why the policy of open access and regulatory 
control over access charges is often a cornerstone of telecommunication competition. 
We will, however, discuss in the next subsection that in the long-run unfettered 
competition between networks in every stage of providing services may well serve the 
best interests of the public. 
 
3.3  Tacit  Collusion 
 
In the previous section we show that the more competitive environment brings 
higher tariffs and thus negative effects to consumer welfare. In this section, we discuss 
the other side of deregulating the network industry. We will argue that a firm’s incentive 
to collude tacitly with its rival on the tariff is greater when the access charges are 
regulated close to marginal costs of providing access. For this argument we consider 
infinitely repeated interactions among networks. 
It is well known that the cooperative outcomes can be achieved as an equilibrium for 
long-lived agents even if the cooperative outcome is not an equilibrium of the stage 
game. We will argue that in the limited competitive environment where the access 
charges are regulated at the marginal costs myopic firms that have no incentive to 
cooperate in the more competitive environment can choose to cooperate. That is, it is 
easier for firms to collaborate in the limited environment in the sense that even more 
myopic firms have incentives enough to sacrifice higher stage game payoffs. 
We will first give a numerical example based on the model used in the previous 
sections and then give the formal results. 
 
Example: We assume that  0 , 0 , 2 / 1 , 1 = = = = c f n m  for a numerical example. In 
fact these are harmless assumption and the results are robust. We first calculate the 
equilibrium when the access charges are regulated. Without loss of generality, we 
consider  p  in which the access charge is set at the marginal costs, that is,   in 
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And the profits are  . If they cooperate in the second stage, they set 
prices to maximize joint profits, that is, 






1 )( ( )
2
1
1 )( ( max arg ) , ( 1 2 2 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 1 p p c p p p c p p p p p + − − + + − − ∈ .          ( 1 6 )  
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Let   be the collusive price, and then  . Let   denote the firm i’s 
cooperative profits with the regulated access charge. As usual  . 
However these profits cannot be achieved as an equilibrium profits by myopic firms. 
This outcome cannot be attained as an equilibrium of the stage game played only once. 
It is well-known that if firms interact repeatedly and they focus on the collusive outcome, 
then the cooperative profits can be achieved at equilibrium in case of long-lived agents. 





RC 9 / 4 2 / 1 2 > = Π =
RC
Now suppose that two firms interact infinitely many times, and both firms discount 
future profits. Let   and   denote theses discount factors and assume that 
. We consider the infinitely repeated game of Bertrand competition with the 
discount factor 
1 β 2 β
β β β = = 2 1
β . At each date t, the firms choose their prices   
simultaneously given access charges to maximize the present discounted value of its 
profits;  . The price strategy    depends on the history 
, where  . It is required that strategies form subgame 
perfect equilibrium in that for any history at date t, firms’ strategy from date t on 
maximizes the present discounted value of profits from that date on. The punishment 
strategy is crucial to achieve the cooperative outcome as an equilibrium. We only 
consider the grim trigger strategy; 
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.                           ( 1 7 )  
 
In charging  , each firm earns 1/2 in each period. By deviating from this 
price, the deviating firms can earn higher profits during the deviation period, but this 
deviation triggers a halt in the cooperation forever. The best response to the other firm's 
price   is to set  . Let   denote the deviating firm’s profit when the 
access charge is regulated. As a result the deviating firm’s profit during the period of 
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.                                            ( 1 8 )  
 
which follows that  , then the strategy in which each firm’s strategy is the 
grim strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
R β β ≡ ≥ 5 / 3
Now we consider two stage network competition of Section 3.2. In the first stage 
they noncooperatively set access charges and in the second stage they compete in the CHONGMIN KIM
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final tariff. The noncooperative outcomes are   in the second 
stage, and in the first stage the equilibrium access charges are determined by 
. Therefore  . In the two 
stage game each firm’s equilibrium profit is 
) ( 5 3 / 2 0 2 1 c a p p
c C C − + = =
69 / 76 ) ( 5 3 / 2 0 2 = − + = c a
c C
0 2 1 69 / 10 c a a a
c C C + = = = 1 = p p
C
494854 . 0 ≅
4761
2356
) , , , ( 2 1 2 1 =
C C C C C




Notice that  , i=1,2. In the two stage game the cooperative profits and the 
prices are the same as in the regulated game since access revenues are cancelled out. We 
assume that they set the noncooperative access charge even if they decide to cooperate. 
Thus also in this case the cooperative prices are   and the cooperative profits 




i Π > Π
CC
i Π 2 , 1 = i
Now we consider again the infinitely repeated game of two stage Bertrand 
competition. 
We assume that firms are able to deviate from the cooperative tariff only. That is, we 
assume that they do not try to deviate from access charges since it is detected without 
delay. Thus the only difference between this game and the regulated access charge game 





























.                           ( 1 9 )  
 
Suppose that the firm 1 decides to deviate from the cooperative price. Then the firm 
1 will choose the price   such  that  1 p
 
)] , ( ) , ( )[ ( ] ) , ( ) max[( arg 1 1 1 2 0 1 1
m m C m
i i p p q p p q c a f p p q c p p − − + − − = ,        ( 2 0 )  
 
where  . Notice that this problem of finding best response to 
 is more complicated than the case of regulated  , since the access revenue 
now affects the firm’s strategic behavior. The solution is   Let   denote 
the deviating firm’s profit during the period of deviation, and then 
. Notice that  . For the grim trigger 
strategy being an equilibrium, the following should be satisfied; 
0 69 / 10 , 0 c a f c
C + = = =
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C β β . Notice that  . 
R C β β >
The above example shows that the regulator's intervention in the access pricing 
procedure can facilitate tacit collusion. In other words, more competitive market 
structure, that is, introducing competition in every stage of providing network services 
cause a breakdown of collusion between networks. The next proposition shows that this 
observation is robust. 
 
Proposition 5 :   
R C β β >
Proof: For each firm not to derivate from the cooperative behavior, the following 
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. Lemma 1 and lemma 2 implies that 
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. This completes the proof. Q.E.D. 
∀
 
Proposition 5 shows that it is easier to collude when access fees are regulated to the 
level of marginal cost of providing access services. Proposition 4, however, shows that 
the final tariff with regulated access charges is lower than that with access charges 
determined by markets. Thus it is ambiguous to judge the net effect of competition. 
These imply that the introduction of competition to the network industry needs to 
accompany relevant regulations to enhance welfare effects. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
This paper proposes a simple model of competition among interconnected networks 
producing services with large substitutability. Networks charge fees to rival networks for 
providing access to its network, i.e., its essential facility. It is shown that the price 
charged by networks is higher when they compete in access prices and final service CHONGMIN KIM
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prices noncooperatively than when access charges are regulated by a regulator. In this 
sense, unfettered competition does not guarantee the increase of customer welfare via 
fierce price competition. It is also shown that the regulator's intervention in the access 
pricing procedure can facilitate tacit collusion. In other words, more competitive market 
structure, that is, introducing competition in every stage of providing network services 
may cause a breakdown of collusion between networks. Thus it is ambiguous to judge 
the net effect of competition. These imply that the introduction of competition to the 
network industry needs to accompany relevant regulations to enhance welfare effects 
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